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Abstract
This paper uses neo-institutional theory to examine the rise and fall of
performance indicators adopted as an element of public accountability
by Australian universities. We argue that performance indicators were
adopted as a symbolic gesture to satisfy the need for externally conferred
legitimacy and to demonstrate accountability to various stakeholders
through publication in the university’s annual report. Also, because
adoption was symbolic and universities were coerced by the Australian
Federal Government, the reporting was curtailed when the coercive
pressures were relaxed or removed.
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Introduction
New Public Management has dominated organisational change in public
sector organisations for over 20 years. Its thrust was directed towards
transforming these organisations from bureaucratic to market-oriented and
efficient entities, primarily focusing on slowing down government growth and
a shift toward privatisation and quasi-privatisation (Hood, 1991). However,
in general terms the focus has been on the introduction of ‘private sector’
management techniques and an increase in public accountability (Ryan et al.,
2008).
The impact of these organisational changes has been well documented
over a variety of public sector organisations and government regulated bodies,
for example public transport (Wiltshire, 1990); general medical practitioners
(Broadbent, Jacobs and Laughlin (2001); public hospitals (Llewellyn
and Northcott, 2005); government audit offices (Pallot, 2003); and social
housing (Collier, 2005). For the Australian university sector, these changes
commenced in 1988 with the Federal Government’s Higher Education: A
policy statement and the establishment of the Unified National System (UNS)
of higher education. This policy required universities to adopt private sector
management techniques to improve planning, budgeting and decision making.
It also required improved public accountability. One of the essential elements
for public accountability was the development of performance indicators and
their publication in university annual reports.
The inducement to join the UNS was a promise of large financial benefits,
continued growth, increased flexibility and greater control over their resources.
Conversely, these benefits required a commitment to internal management
reviews, the adoption of private sector management structures, techniques and
practices, together with a reduction in the size of governing bodies to reflect
the size and composition of large private corporations. Failure to meet these
conditions would jeopardize the associated financial benefits (Harrold, 1991).
Using an institutional lens this paper explores the adoption and the
decline of an accountability measure. Specifically, performance indicators,
which were accepted as an objective and systematic procedure for the discharge
of a universities public accountability responsibilities (Linke, 1991). However,
this study is not about the adoption and decline in the use of performance
indicators in Australian universities—it is about the adoption and decline in
the public reporting of such indicators in university annual reports as one
measure of their accountability.
Institutional Setting
By the mid-1980s participation in higher education started to increase
dramatically, raising questions about its efficiency and effectiveness. This
7
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culminated in the Review of Efficiency and Effectiveness in Higher Education
(Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission, 1986), which was highly
critical of management practices within the sector. The economic downturn
in Australia during the 1980s highlighted the government’s concern about
the perceived gap between the sector’s contemporary performance and
the performance required to help Australia survive and prosper in a more
competitive international economic environment. In this manner the reforms
emerged as a result of the government’s assessment of the gap between the
sectors contemporary performance and that which was required to help
Australia survive and prosper in a more competitive international economic
environment (Harrold, 1991).
From the government’s perspective these issues could be resolved
by focusing on improving the university’s accountability to its different
stakeholders and tightening institutional management and accountability
practices through a deliberate move from collegial governance to governance
through managerial authority, with this move reinforced, in part, by the
introduction of new models and management practices. The interesting point
is that the managerial and accountability reforms that were key elements of
the UNS were never authorized by legislation. They were merely embodied
in contractual arrangements between the Minister and the CEO’s of member
institutions.
Performance Indicators: A Mechanism for Accountability
The evolution of performance indicators in Australian universities can be
viewed through an examination of (1) the requirement for their development
contained in the Dawkins White Paper (1988), (2) their development by
government through the Linke Report (1991), and (3) their performance as
an accountability measure as detailed in the Hoare Report (1995). Table 1
presents a tabular summary of the timeline of key events organised by the
actors involved.
The white paper only contained a partial range of performance
indicators, supporting instead the development of a funding system that
responded to institutional performance and accountability (Dawkins, 1988:
85). The performance indicators outlined by the government are displayed in
Table 2.
The Performance Indicators Research Group (Linke, 1991) was
established by the Australian Federal Government in February 1989 to develop
a broad range of quantitative performance indicators suitable for use at both
system and institutional levels. The group classified the indicators into three
broad categories: indicators of institutional context, indicators of institutional
performance and indicators of participation and social equity. While the project
was established, in part, to address emerging and persistent calls for improved
8
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Table 1
A Timeline of Key Events in the Development of Performance Indicators
Time

Actor(s)

Event

Publication

July 1988

Australian Federal
Government — J.S.
Dawkins, Minister
for Employment,
Education and
Training

The issue of a white paper
detailing specific performance
indicators for universities and
the penalties for non-adoption

Higher
Education:
A Policy
Statement

Feb 1989 –
Jul 1991

Australian Federal
Government —
R.D. Linke, Chair,
Performance
Indicators Research
Group

The establishment of a cluster
of performance indicators
recommended for adoption by
Australian universities

Performance
Indicators
in Higher
Education

1988–1996

Australian universities Adoption of performance
indicators to satisfy the
requirements of the UNS

June 1995 –
Dec 1995

Australian Federal
Government — D.
Hoare, Chair HEMR

2006

Australian universities Review of the reporting of
performance indicators as an
accountability measure

Report on the use of
performance indicators
and the effectiveness of
accountability requirements

Higher
Education
Management
Review

efficiency and public accountability, the research group issued a note of caution
relating to the interpretation of performance indicators (Linke, 1991; 128):
The basic function of performance indicators is to assist in
determining how well a particular institution or department
has achieved its respective goals. In this respect they form an
important part — but only a part — of a broader evaluation process,
in which their proper role as an aid to expert judgement rests on
establishing a clear understanding of what characteristics are to
be evaluated and what the indicators can and cannot measure in
relation to these characteristics.

The indicators developed are also shown in Table 2.
Partly in response to this cautionary note, the Australian Federal
Government announced, on 5 June 1995, a review of the higher education system
to continue the “development of excellence in management and accountability”
(Hoare, 1995: 1). Due to the short timeframe allowed to complete the report,
the committee focused on five key areas, among which were accountability and
9
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Table 2
Outline of Various Performance Indicators Developed
1988 White Paper

1991 Performance Indicators
Research Group

1995 Higher Education
Management Review

Relative staffing
levels

Institutional Context
Academic and general staff provision
Student demand and background
characteristics
Financial resource distribution

Resource usage

Quality of teaching
Quality of curriculum
Course completion
rates
Student satisfaction
Research
publications

Institutional Performance
Teaching and Learning
Quality of teaching
Student progress and achievement
Graduate employment
Research and Professional Service
Research publications, and so on
Professional service

Student dropout rates
Measures of academic
excellence
Research performance
Quality assurance

Consultancy rates
Indigenous
participation

Social Equity
Social composition
Educational provision

Source: Dawkins,
1988: 85–86

Source: Linke. 1991: 19–125

Source: Hoare, 1995:
63–64

strategic management (which included performance indicators). The report
acknowledge contemporary accountability as an outcome-based measure
involved in the critical processes of evaluating performance, and as such, it is
widely recognized as a major management tool (Hoare, 1995: 35). The report
saw accountability as a key theme which permeates the discussion on strategic
management and is driven by, and reported through, performance indicators
which present specific challenges relating to the measurement of performance,
because quantitative measures are not always possible or appropriate. While
the report failed to identify specific performance indicators, it did comment on
the general indicators it felt appropriate to fulfill an institution’s accountability
requirement without disturbing the concept of institutional independence.
These are also incorporated in Table 2.
Review of the Literature
Emergent theories drawing on a range of ‘institutional’ perspectives have
attempted to explain the adoption and use of new public management
reforms within the context of organisational change (Granlund and Lukka,
10
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1998; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Burns and Vaivio, 2001). This study uses
neo-institutionalism approach (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Greenwood and
Hinings, 1996). This approach represents a convergence around multiple
themes suggested by old and new institutionalism. In this model the concept
of institutional isomorphism, and its components, coercive, mimetic and
normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) are seen as a primary
means for the analysis of the institutional environment. This, together with
institutional legitimacy provides the neo-institutional framework linking the
dynamics of power and politics.
New institutionalism also emphasises the legitimacy and embedding of
such beliefs and norms within organisational fields, as seen in the seminal
works of Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1991) and
expanded on by Deephouse (1996), Brown (1997) and Deephouse and Carter
(2005). They argue that belief systems and norms change over time, and
those institutional concepts provide a valid means of studying emerging and
changing influences on organisations.
Recent research focusing on change within specific organisational
types analyze and explain the adoption (or rejection) of innovative systems
and practices at a micro level (Collier, 2001; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005;
Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006). In explaining changes that take place in the formal
structure of an organization, specifically relating to the societal expectations
and acceptance of management issues, considerable emphasis has been placed
on the environment in which the organisation exists (Covaleski and Dirsmith,
1988a). Much of this literature focuses on how organisations change to become
isomorphic with their environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Institutional
theorists such as Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983),
Zucker (1987) and Scott (1995) suggest that organisations are influenced
by coercive, mimetic and normative pressures placed on them which lead
to institutional isomorphism. These pressures often emanate from sources
such as the public, government and other regulatory bodies, and have, as a
fundamental consequence—organisational legitimacy.
Organisational legitimacy seeks to explain the adoption of new management
reforms through the perceived legitimacy associated with information provided
to stakeholders, such as government and the public, as a mechanism for raising
the profile of the organization or reducing conflict (Ansari and Euske, 1987;
Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988a; Mezias, 1990; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Modell,
2001). This emergent frame of reference recognizes management practices as
a medium through which social expectations flow and change organisational
practice, and that such practices may develop as a consequence of coercive and
mimetic forces arising in institutions outside the organisation.
Research into management practices in publicly funded institutions and
government organisations that are required to be self-funded support these
predictions. Geiger and Ittner’s (1996) study used new institutional theory
11
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to explain the adoption of particular practices in government organisations
funded by allocation, together with government organisations required to be
self-funding. Their evidence supports the predication that organisations adopt
new management practices in order to appear efficient and legitimate. In such
instances, these new practices are predicted to be implemented symbolically
by organisations to improve their external conferred legitimacy, generally
conferred by government, the public and professional associations (Deephouse,
1996; Geiger and Ittner, 1996).
Therefore organisational legitimacy is the acceptance of an organization
by its external environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer and Scott, 1983;
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This is a crucial concept in institutional theory,
serving as an “anchor-point of a vastly expanded theoretical apparatus”
(Suchman, 1995: 571). Therefore, a legitimate organisation is one whose
values and actions are congruent with the legitimacy-conferring groups. This
status is conferred by social actors (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Ashforth and
Gibbs, 1990), who are seen as having the authority to grant such legitimacy,
the government (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Meyer and Scott,
1983) and the public, through public opinion (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer
and Scott, 1983; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Elsbach, 1994; Deephouse, 1996).
This study, informed by new institutional theory, examines the adoption
of performance indicators as a measurement of public accountability and the
decline of reporting this measure over time. This extends the study of new
institutional theory to determine if the theory can be used to examine these
issues, thereby strengthening the linkage between institutional theories and
practice.
This focus views the environment as comprising symbolic elements that
are capable of affecting organisational forms independently of the technical
requirement of the organization. In such cases the adoption and use of
management practices may be symbolic, mythical or ceremonial, in order to
enhance the organization’s appearance of rationality and efficiency (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1983; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983: Covaleski et al., 1996). Therefore,
a legitimate organization is one whose values and actions are congruent with
that external party’s values and expectations for action (Deephouse, 1996;
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
The incorporation of institutionalized practices provides a measure
of conferred legitimacy on the organisations activities and also protects
it from having its conduct questioned. Since the survival of government
organisations depend primarily on the support of external constituents, and
only secondarily on actual performance (Gupta et al., l994), the adoption and
use of government-initiated management practices maintain organisational
legitimacy and ensure continued funding. Building on this body of literature,
empirical studies of management practices within the public sector indicate
that publicly funded organisations often implement elaborate management
12
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systems to conform to external requirements. However, evidence suggests
that the adoption of management practices, including performance indicators,
for the purpose of increasing accountability, is symbolic (Berry et al., 1985;
Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1991; Lapsley, 1994).
New institutional theory predicts that while the new practices will be
implemented, they may not actually be used to improve performance or lead
to greater accountability. This prediction is derived from the general theme of
the institutional perspective, which is that an organisations survival requires
it to conform to social norms of acceptable behavior as much as to achieve
high levels of efficiency (Covaleski et al., 1996). Therefore, we argue that the
introduction of performance indicators as a measure of accountability only
serves as a ritualistic/ceremonial means for symbolically demonstrating an
organisations commitment to rational decision making (Meyer and Rowan,
1977). We also argue that where this symbolic adoption is accompanied by
coercive pressure the adoption will fail over time.
Hypothesis Development
The issue of conferred legitimacy provides the prediction from institutional
theories that when externally initiated practices are used to improve perceived
organisational legitimacy, the adoption will be symbolic. Meyer and Rowan
(1977: 341) contribute the theoretical underpinning of this concept. They
hypothesize that isomorphism with environmental institutions results in some
crucial consequences for organisations. Therefore, all aspects of the formal
structure, including the management structure, will “dramatically reflect the
myths of their institutional environment instead of the demands of their work
activities”. This gives rise to Hypothesis 1:
H1:

The motivation for conferred legitimacy will produce symbolic
adoption of government-initiated accountability practices.

In addition to organisational legitimacy, the mechanism of coercive
isomorphism will influence symbolically adopted practices. Coercive
isomorphism is an influence that “results from both formal and informal
pressures exerted on organisations by other organisations upon which they
are dependent” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 150).
Further, where practices adopted to secure external legitimacy through
accountability are only symbolic they may lack permanency. Carruthers (1995,
313) argument supports this as “ceremonial adherence to legitimate norms
may have little material impact because formal organisational structure is
decoupled from actual organisational processes”. This argument of decoupling
supports Mouritsen’s (1994) claim that public sector agencies are orientated
by the history dependency of organisational action to reject reform programs
that politicians may initiate. However, where coercive pressure results in
13
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the adoption of symbolic practices, the practice may be short lived (Swidler,
1979). Indeed, the need to lodge symbolic managerial practices (performance
indicators) in a formally defined role (accountability reporting) is a constant
obstacle to the maintenance of that organisational role (Kanter, 1972;
Rothschild-Whitt, 1979).
This is the basis for Hypothesis 2:
H2:

Practices adopted symbolically under coercive pressure will
collapse over time.

Research Methods
Design for Hypothesis 1
Sample
For Hypothesis 1 the sample represents the views of senior university
administrators within Australian universities. The initial population consisted
of 40 organisations defined by the Federal Government as institutions of higher
education. Four organisations were removed from the group because, although
federally funded, they either had not changed their profile from before the
introduction of the UNS, or they were new single-discipline specifically funded
institutions. The resulting 36 institutions all carried the status of “university”
and were incorporated under their own specific state or territory legislation.
These 36 universities represented 90 percent of federally funded institutions
of higher education in Australia operating between 1992 and 2007.
Data
The data source was a structured questionnaire, designed to test particular
attributes of new institutional theory in a higher educational setting, and
an archival review of the annual reports for the period 1989 to 1996 of all
universities included in the sample. This review was carried out to obtain an
understanding of the antecedent period, the event period and the outcome
of the introduction of performance indicators. The outcome of this review
provided verification and an adoption point for performance indicators within
universities, displayed in Table 3.
Questionnaire Design and Administration
The new institutional theory framework used in the study guided the design
of the questionnaire. Questions were designed to help explain the factors
behind the adoption of performance indicators as an accountability measure,
and identify the degree of perceived legitimacy associated with those practices.
Two specific questions were used for this, each containing a series of more
14

Watts, McNair and Baard: From Inception to Inertia

Table 3
Adoption Years for Performance Indicators
Year of Adoption
Performance
Indicators

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

Total

1

1

2

6

1

7

0

5

23

detailed items. The first question focused on the issue of legitimacy; the second
was directed at symbolic adoption of the practices. A pilot questionnaire was
tested at four universities before being administered. In addition, a question
was asked that determined the perceived level of coercive pressure used by the
Federal Government in the adoption of performance indicators.
Response Rate
The questionnaire was distributed to staff at three levels of university
administration: vice-chancellors, senior university administrators, and
business managers. Together they represent the three major areas where
performance indicators could be used: academic administration, student
administration and business administration. Because the focus of this part
of the study was the adoption of performance indicators as a measure of
accountability by the university, data collection was kept at the central, rather
than the faculty level. The questionnaires were distributed by mail to 108
managers in 36 publicly funded Australian universities.
Table 4 shows that, of the 108 questionnaires distributed, 54 were
returned, of which 52 were useable. This represented a response rate of 50
percent, with a useable rate of 48 percent. Responses from the three levels
of management were evenly distributed at 47 percent from vice-chancellors,
53 percent from senior university managers and 44 percent from business
managers. Table 4 also reports the responses of individuals by state, individuals
by level and university by state.
Variable Measurement
Dependent Variable
A single dependent variable was examined: symbolic adoption. The objective
of constructing this dependent variable was to determine to what extent the
individual respondents perceived that the adoption of performance indicators
as a measure of accountability was a symbolic gesture which conformed to
social and institutional expectations. The data was obtained through Question
2 of the questionnaire, which consisted of four items.
15
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Table 4
Data Collection Results
Questionnaires
Distributed

Number of
Respondents
(Useable)

Response
(Useable)

33
6
24
3
9
12
3
18

19
3
9
2
3
8
3
5

58%
50%
38%
67%
33%
67%
100%
28%

108

52

48%

36
36
36

17
19
16

47%
53%
44%

108

52

48%

New South Wales
Australian Capital Territory
Victoria
Tasmania
South Australia
Western Australia
Northern Territory
Queensland

11
2
8
1
3
4
1
6

8
2
4
1
1
4
1
2

73%
100%
50%
100%
33%
100%
100%
33%

Total

36

23

64%

Individual Responses — State
New South Wales
Australian Capital Territory
Victoria
Tasmania
South Australia
Western Australia
Northern Territory
Queensland
Total

Individual Responses — Level
Vice-Chancellors
Senior University Administrators
Business Managers
Total

University Responses — State

These items were derived from various studies that considered symbolic
use (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 1991; Covaleski, et al., 1993; Covaleski, et
al., 1996) and were based on the underlying theory espoused by Scott (1995).
The items focused on four issues. Item 1 considered the argument that specific
16
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practices are instrumental in the creation of a social reality (Covaleski and
Dirsmith, 1988b). Item 2 reflected the view that specific practices are symbols
of a need to conform to social expectations of acceptable practice (Covaleski
and Dirsmith, 1986; Covaleski et. al., 1993). Item 3 focused on practices as
symbols, which have their effect by shaping the meanings attributed to such
activities (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995). Item 4 probed the concept
that practices are a symbolic gesture that reinforces the expectations of
external parties (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
Respondents scored each item on a seven-point Likert scale ranging
from 1: no influence to 7: highly influential. The responses to each item were
summed and the mean was then used to give an overall symbolic adoption
score with a theoretical range of 1 to 7. The higher the score, the greater the
symbolic adoption of the practice.
To gain insights into the reliability of the symbolic adoption score,
factor analysis was used to examine if the measure was uni-dimensional. As
suggested by Lehmann (1989), a factor loading of 0.5 or less was used as a
guide for identifying the items least influencing the construct. The analysis
showed that, overall, all items exhibited influence on symbolic adoption of the
practices. To confirm the findings from the factor analysis, the Cronbach alpha
reliability coefficient was calculated. The result was 0.9316.
Independent Variable
The independent variable used to explore the influence that institutional
pressure had on the symbolic adoption of performance indicators for
accountability was conferred legitimacy. As with symbolic adoption, the review
of the literature failed to identify any prior measures that could be used in
this study. This was due to the nature of the previous research, which was
mainly limited to single organization case studies. Therefore, it was necessary
to develop suitable measures for this study. These measures were developed
from the empirical and theoretical work of major researchers.
Legitimacy
The objective in constructing this variable was to determine to what extent
the individual respondents perceived that their institution was under pressure
to conform to the values and actions of interested external parties in order
to have organisational legitimacy conferred upon it by that external party/
organization. This question consisted of four items, and were designed to
capture the notion of organisational legitimacy, which is described as a
condition reflecting cultural alignment, normative support or consonance with
relevant rules or laws (Scott, 1995). The items focused on three issues: first,
organisations established by, and operating in accordance with, relevant legal
or quasi-legal requirements (Item 1) (Scott, 1995). The second issue considered
the argument that organisations were predisposed to accept structures that
17
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presented a higher level of accountability as legitimate (Items 2 and 3) (Scott,
1995). The third issue is that a legitimate organization is one whose values
and actions are congruent with the values and expectations for action of
the legitimacy-conferring organization (Item 4) (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978;
Galaskiewicz, 1985).
Respondents scored each item on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from
1: no influence to 7: highly influential. The responses to each item were summed
and the mean was then calculated to give an overall score for legitimacy, with
a theoretical range of 1 to 7. The higher the score, the greater the level of
legitimacy associated with the use of the practice.
Again, factor analysis was used to evaluate the measure. The analysis
indicated that the legitimacy score was uni-dimensional for performance
indicators, with the loading factor exceeding the required 0.5 requirement.
The Cronbach alpha reliability coefficient was calculated at 0.8328.
Table 5 summarizes the descriptive statistics for all variables based on
performance indicators.

Table 5
Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables
N

Mean

Std dev

Median

Min

Max

52

4.1962

1.1652

4.7000

1.00

5.60

52

4.1500

1.2661

4.4000

1.00

6.20

Dependent Variable
Symbolic Adoption
Performance Indicators (SAPI)
Independent Variables
Performance Indicators
Legitimacy (LEGPI)

A single question was also asked of the respondents: ‘Do you believe
that coercive pressure was applied relating to the adoption of performance
indicators as part of the accountability framework?’. Respondents were
asked to scored on a six-point Likert scale ranging from 1: no influence to 6:
highly influential. Because the response constituted the entire population no
statistical analysis was performed.
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Research Design
To test Hypothesis 1, the following cross-sectional regression was estimated:
SAij =

a + b LG + e
1

ij

j

Where:
SAij = the symbolic adoption by a university i of performance indicators,
as constructed from the survey;
LGij = measure of legitimacy for a university i, for the adoption of
performance indicators j, as constructed from the survey; and

e = error term.
j

Based on the stated predictions, it was expected that the sign of b1 would be
positive.
Design for Hypothesis 2
Multiple sources, including: different survey sites, documentary evidence
and interviews (Simons, 1990; Merchant, 1985; Yin, 1984) was used to test
Hypothesis 2. A review of all Australian university annual reports was carried
out in 2007. The annual reports were for 2006 and the reporting of performance
indicators was grouped into nil, minimal, some and comprehensive usage.
These universities were cross-referenced to the universities involved in the
earlier study (Watts, 2001). In the 2001 research, 23 universities out of an
Australian total of 36 universities responded, of which 20 identified themselves.
Telephone interviews were carried out with senior staff at six universities, and
followed the interview protocols suggested by Brownell (1995). Three were with
universities that had discontinued the reporting of performance indicators
and three with universities that still reported performance indicators in their
annual reports.
The six respondents were asked a series of open-ended questions focusing
on the retention or rejection of the reporting of performance indicators in
annual reports. These interviews were conducted by telephone, which provided
the opportunity to correct misunderstandings and otherwise redirect the
respondent towards the intended thrust of questions.
Results
Hypothesis 1
Table 6 presents the results of the regression analysis of the relationship
between conferred legitimacy and symbolic adoption of performance indicators.
The regression results are positive and significant with an R2 of .571,
19
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Table 6
Symbolic Adoption Regression Analyses for the Accounting Practice
Performance Indicators (SAPI)

LEGPI
Constant

Constant
Beta
t.
Significance
R square
Adjusted R square
F
Significance

1.309
3.544
.001

.756
8.164
.000

***
.571
.563
66.654
.000

***

Notes
SAij
SAij

=
=
=

LGij

=

***

a + b1LGij + ej
Significant at 1% level
The symbolic adoption by university i of one of the performance
indicators), as constructed from the survey;
Measure of legitimacy for university i, for performance indicators j, as
constructed from the survey.

an adjusted R2 of .563, an F- statistic of 66.654, and the overall regression
is significant at 0.000. These results suggest that the desire for externally
conferred legitimacy serves as a good explanation for the symbolic adoption of
performance indicators for accountability purposes.
The results confirm Hypothesis 1, which states that the greater the desire
for conferred legitimacy, the greater the adoption of practices will be symbolic.
The results add to the empirical weight of management-based institutional
studies using multiple sites and standard statistical analysis. The results also
provide evidence that institutional theory can be used to examine a specific
collection or classification of organisations.
Hypothesis 2
The results for the question on coercive pressures are depicted in Table 7,
which suggests that the majority of respondents felt that coercive pressure
was applied through the incentives and threats associated with the Federal
Government’s requirements to join the UNS. Clustering the responses above
and below the mid point, it is evident that 78 percent of the respondents
considered the influence to be significant, while only 22 percent considered the
influence as less than significant. This finding supports Hypothesis 2.
20
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Table 7
The Extent to which Coercive Measures were used when Introducing the UNS of
Higher Education
No
Influence
1
New South Wales

2

Australian Capital Territory

1

Victoria

Total
Influence
2

3

4

5

6

3

3

7

1

1
1

South Australia

1

3

1

1

2

1

Western Australia

1

3

Queensland

2

2

Northern Territory
Tasmania

2
1

1

15

14

3

1
9
22%

5

1

3

31
78%

The result of the analysis of university annual reports also supports
Hypothesis 2: that the practices adopted symbolically under coercive pressure
will collapse over time. This is displayed in Table 8, which indicates that 47
percent of Australian universities now do not report, or minimally report,
performance indicators in their annual reports.
Interviews with Respondents
Various explanations can be attributed to the drop in reporting performance
indicators in university annual reports. However, to provide a deeper
understanding of the phenomena, telephone interviews were carried out with
senior staff from six universities: three that had reduced, and three that had
retained the reporting of performance indicators. Of the 26 universities that
responded to original research (Watts, 2001) 20 identified themselves. This
allowed a comparison of specific universities from the Watts (2001) research
with the analysis of annual reporting practices in 2006. Of the 20 identifiable
universities, eleven (55 percent) are identified as being within the some/high
category and nine, (45 percent) are identified in the nil/minimal category. This
is displayed in Table 9.
Interviews provided some insight into the decisions to continue with,
or disregard, the reporting of performance indicators in annual reports. One
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Table 8
Level of University Performance Indicators Reported – 2006
University Annual Reports, 2006 — Level of Compliance
Reviewed

Nil

Minimal

New South Wales

2006

1

6

Victoria

2006

1

2

Western Australia

2006

Queensland

2006

2

2

South Australia

2006

2

Australian Capital Territory

2006

1

Northern Territory/Tasmania

2006

Some

High
4

2

3
4

4

13

Total universities

4
1
1

1

3

17

18

20

47%

53%

Table 9
Identifiable University in Previous Research
Self-identifying Universities
Identified

Nil

Minimal

New South Wales

6

2

1

Victoria

3

1

2

Western Australia

4

Queensland

1

South Australia

1

1

Australian Capital Territory

2

1

Northern Territory/Tasmania

3

1

1

1

6

1

10

Total — self-identifying
Total — grouped

22

20

Some

High
3

4
1

3

1

9

11

45%

55%
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senior academic/administrator from a New South Wales university stated that
his university had stopped reporting because:
It was seen as a duplication of resources as most of the information
is provided to the Federal Government in other university reports,
such as our strategic plan. Also, the administrative burden
associated with reporting made the practice inefficient.

A senior administrator at a Victorian university observed:
It is no longer necessary to report these indicators. It was when
the Labor Government was in power and threatened to reduce
resources if we did not give then what they wanted. Now it does
not so seem so important.

Further, a senior academic from a university in the Australian Capital
Territory stated that their university’s decision to reduce the reporting of
indicators in the annual report was justified:
Over time my university has progressively reduced the amount of
information we provided to the opposition (universities) — we are
in a competitive business. We now structure our annual report
around our key goals and objectives without needing to justify
our performance. This, it seems, is acceptable to our stakeholders.

Universities that retained the practice of public reporting did so as a systematic
process of defining, measuring and reporting on their performance, and as a
marketing tool. In Queensland a senior academic stated:
… that by demonstrating our performance on a number of
dimensions we retain the trust given to us by the public and at
the same time retain our status.

The interviewee from the Australian Capital Territory suggested that:
The old reporting requirements, through the annual report,
empowered and supported senior staff in carrying out their
proper functions. It also provided us the opportunity to compare
ourselves with other similar-sized universities — to benchmark
ourselves, if you like.

A New South Wales a deputy vice-chancellor stated:
One reason we report our performance indicators is because we
are good, and we want the public to know it. By showing our high
student retention rates, high completion rates, low staff student/
staff ratios we attract the best students. Also, our reported
research output attracts the best academic researchers. We find
this a win-win situation from a marketing perspective.
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Conclusions
This study examined the adoption of performance indicators as a government
requirement for improving reported accountability in Australian universities.
It concluded with a review of university annual reports in 2006, which
identified a significant decline of the reporting of performance indicators in
annual reports. The initial analysis considered the responses from 52 senior
managers in 23 Australian universities in 1999. The second analysis reviewed
the reporting practices in 2006. This study focused on two research questions:
(1) to what extent was the adoption of the performance indicators a symbolic
action on the part of the universities to increase their level of externally
conferred legitimacy, and (2) why the public reporting of performance
indicators had declined.
The results support the proposition proposed by institutional theory:
that the desire for conferred legitimacy will produce symbolic adoption of
government-initiated management practices. The results also support the
proposition that practices adopted symbolically under coercive pressure
will collapse over time. The study also provides insights which advance the
arguments for using institutional theory by examining the theoretical tradition
at a national or system level over multiple sites, rather than at the individual
unit level. This supports the suggestion that institutional theory can be used
to examine a specific collection or classification of organisations.
Concluding Comments and Issues of Further Research
While the response rates in this study may appear small, 64 percent from
institutions and 48 percent from individuals, the paper’s major limitation is
the number of organisations tested. At the time of undertaking the initial
research, 36 universities represented the total Australian population of
federally funded universities. However, the research potential of this method
of investigation seems vast. One way to proceed would be an analysis of larger
public sector departments, to determine the extent of symbolic adoption and
continued use of accountability measures resulting from new public sector
management and reforms.
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